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The Norwegian public sector has net ﬁnancial assets.
determination applies equally to Norway and economies with net public debt: If
primary surpluses evolve independently of nominal debt (or assets), the price level
has to adjust to satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector. In
this ‘non-Ricardian’ regime, monetary policy cannot provide the nominal anchor. In
the alternative ‘Ricardian’ regime, surpluses respond to debt, and monetary policy is
the nominal anchor. The plausibility of NR regimes is disputed. I use ﬁscal data and
oil prices to argue that the Norwegian regime is Ricardian.
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June 2, 2005
The ﬁscal theory of price1 Introduction and summary
A c c o r d i n gt ot h e‘ ﬁscal theory of price level determination’1, the price level may be
determined by the intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector. The alterna-
tive and more traditional assumption is that the price level is determined by monetary
policy. It is for example often assumed that an interest-rate reaction function pins
down the price level. Woodford (1995) calls a monetary-ﬁscal regime where monetary
policy can pin down the price level a ‘Ricardian’ (R) regime. Woodford’s R regime
is deﬁn e db ya ne n d o g e n o u sﬁscal policy that makes the public sector intertemporal
budget constraint hold exactly regardless of the prevailing price path. In a ‘Non-
Ricardian’ (NR) regime on the other hand, the price level has to adjust to assure
that the present-value budget constraint of the public sector holds with equality in
equilibrium. In an NR regime the path of primary surpluses does not respond enough
to real public liabilities to make sure that the intertemporal budget constraint of the
public sector holds given any price level. Monetary policy authorities can therefore
not pin down the price level. If they tried to, no equilibrium would exist.
The central bank of Norway has an inﬂation target, and the presence of an R
regime is a precondition for the central bank’s ability to implement the target23.I t
may also be of some general interest to know whether an NR regime is empirically
plausible in the case of Norway. Norway is exceptional in the sense that the public
sector has large positive ﬁnancial assets. Tax income from the petroleum sector has
enabled the public sector to run budget surpluses. The ﬁscal theory of the price level
applies equally to an economy with net public ﬁnancial wealth and to one with high
net public liabilities. But the empirical relevance of an NR regime might depend on
the ﬁnancial position of the public sector.
I ﬁrst present impulse-response functions calculated from VARs in the surpluses
and the real liabilities of the public sector, following the approach of Canzoneri,
Cumby, and Diba (2001b)(CCD). CCD point out that in an R regime, the one-period
lagged response in liabilities to a positive shock in the surplus will be negative. In
an NR regime the response may be positive, negative or zero depending on the time
1Contributions to this literature include among many others Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba
(2001b), Cochrane (1998), Woodford (1995) and Sims (1994). For an overview of this literature
and a more complete list of references, see Woodford (2001).
2In practice, the traditional conditions for ‘Ricardian Equivalence’ (e.g. frictionless capital mar-
k e t s )w i l ln o th o l d ,a n dﬁscal policy may be assumed to aﬀect the price level via demand for that
reason. These eﬀects may feed into the reaction function of monetary authorities in an R regime as
deﬁned above. An R regime is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for Ricardian Equivalence.
3Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001c), Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001a) and
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001b)discuss uniqueness problems when authorities follow
interest rate reaction functions. In their work, the interest rate reaction function of the monetary
authorities may pin down the price level in a locally R equilibrium, but an NR regime may help
ensure global uniqueness. An empirical investigation of the type of regime will necessarily have to
be concerned with the forces that ensure uniqueness around the actual historical equilibrium of the
economy.
2series process of the surplus. If there is no negative autocorrelation in the surplus
series, one will be able to distinguish between the regimes based on impulse-response
functions. The evidence from my VAR estimations for Norway is inconclusive, since
I ﬁnd negative autocorrelation in the surplus series.
Next I test for Granger causality using the oil tax and the real public liabilities.
This approach to the question is new here, and seems to be more informative. If
the oil-tax data are exogenous to public liabilities the oil tax should not be Granger
caused by public liabilities in an R regime. But in an NR regime the oil-tax income
should be Granger caused by public liabilities. The reason is that in the NR case, the
direction of causality is from expected future surpluses to liabilities. That is, evidence
of Granger causality from the liabilities series to the oil-tax series should appear if
and only if the regime is NR (given that the oil tax really is exogenous to liabilities).
This is in contrast to the regular surplus, which should respond to liabilities in an R
regime, and hence should be Granger caused by liabilities in any regime. I ﬁnd that
real liabilities do not Granger cause oil-tax income. This is evidence of an R regime.
One may be worried that oil tax income is not truly exogenous to the level of public
debt. I note that the oil price is highly correlated with oil-tax income, and the oil
price may be assumed to be exogenous to Norwegian decisions4.I ﬁnd no Granger
causality from the liabilities to the oil price. Also, there is no response in the real
value of the liabilities to a shock in the oil price calculated from a VAR in the oil
price, the surplus and the liabilities. Based on this I ﬁnd it plausible that an R regime
has been in place in Norway rather than an NR regime.
Section 2 below is a brief review of the theory. Estimation results are presented
in section 3 and concluding remarks follow in section 4.
2 Theoretical background
2.1 The deﬁnition of Ricardian (R) and Non-Ricardian (NR)
policy regimes
The terms ‘Ricardian’ and ’Non-Ricardian’ monetary-ﬁscal regimes were ﬁrst used
by Woodford (1995). I work with CCD’s version of the intertemporal public budget
constraint, which diﬀers from Woodford’s only in that they work with variables rel-
ative to nominal GDP. I reproduce their equations here. The present value budget
constraint is derived from the period budget constraint of the public sector;
Bj =( Tj − Gj)+( Mj+1 − Mj)+Bj+1/(1 + ij) (1)
4Even though Norway is the worlds third largest oil exporter, the volume of its production is
only about 5 percent of the world market.
3where Mj and Bj are stocks of base money and net government liabilities at the
beginning of period j, Tj − Gj is the primary surplus during period j,a n dij is the
net nominal one period interest rate for period j. T h ec o n s t r a i n ts a y st h a te x p i r i n g
b o n d sh a v et ob eﬁnanced by the primary surplus, by seigniorage, or they have to be
reﬁnanced. The government issues nominal liabilities, Mj +Bj.T h ee ﬀect of issuing
liabilities in foreign currency (or acquiring assets denominated in foreign currency, as
is relevant for Norway) for the reasoning that follows is discussed in appendix B on
page 19.
Expressing the government budget constraint in terms of total liabilities, and
dividing through by the nominal gross domestic product Pjyj gives the following























Like CCD, I simplify the notation and replace the above equation by
wj = sj + αjwj+1 (3)
where wj is the liabilities to Pjyj ratio, sj is the surplus to Pjyj ratio (including
transfers from the central bank), and αj is the discount factor
yj+1/yj
(1+ij)(Pj/Pj+1). CCD
iterate on (3) to get the following present value budget constraint:




















According to Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001b), if ﬁscal policy makes
sure that (4) or equivalently (5) holds regardless of endogenous variables, we have
a Ricardian (R) regime6. In the type of model CCD have in mind, the potential
endogenous variables are prices, nominal interest rates and real output. Hence, the
regime is R if the surplus series st responds to innovations in total public liabilities
wt or the series of discount factors αt to make sure that (4) holds.
5The transversality condition follows as an equilibrium condition from a ‘No-Ponzi-game’ condi-
tion in combination with the budget constraint and utility maximization in the private sector. See
for example Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996), page 715.
6The deﬁnition of R and NR regimes in Woodford (1995) are diﬀerent from Benhabib, Schmitt-
Grohe, and Uribe (2001b)’s deﬁnition. Woodford (1995) refers to a transversality condition on
government debt excluding money. In the discussion of this topic in Woodford (2003), the diﬀerence
is avoided by referring to a model without money.
4On the other hand, if the path of real primary surpluses including transfers from
the central bank st is exogenous to the value of real public liabilities wt,t h er e g i m ei s
deﬁned as Non-Ricardian (NR). In an NR regime, an innovation in the st series must
imply that either discount factors αt or wt have to jump in order to make sure that
(4) is satisﬁed. wt can jump if the price level or current real output can jump, but the
numerator Mt+Bt is a predetermined variable in period t (because it is the beginning
of period nominal value of total liabilities). Following CCD, the empirical question I
am interested in is therefore the causality between real liabilities wt and ﬁscal policy
as represented by the expected future path of st in the present value budget constraint
(4). The regime is NR if causality goes from the net present value of surpluses to
total liabilities, while the regime is R if causality goes from total liabilities to the net
present value of surpluses.
Nominal values and prices have to enter in equations (4) and (5) in order for
the question of an R or NR regime to be meaningful. Without prices entering the
equations, the equations have to be satisﬁed in equilibrium independently of the price
level, and the regime is R.
When modelling economic policy, it may be convenient to determine the implied
regime by checking whether the implied path of public debt or assets satisﬁes (5)
given any path of prices and nominal interest rates. In the case of a wealthy public
sector, the question is whether public assets grow ‘too fast’ or not. For example,
Akram (2005) suggests a policy for Norwegian consumption of petroleum revenues
that will minimize disturbances to the sectoral composition of the economy caused by
petroleum revenues (via real exchange rate changes). Assuming that all petroleum
wealth is publicly owned, that the public sector has no other assets or liabilities, and
that petroleum revenues are the only source of public revenues, we may check whether
the suggested policy regime is Ricardian: With the notation in Akram (2005), initial
real public wealth is W0, the real interest rate (return on real wealth Wt)i sar and a
fraction cr of Wt is consumed each period7. The growth rate of real wealth is ar−cr.
We may furthermore assume a constant growth rate of the economy g for the purpose
of this example. We also assume that the consumption rate is not high enough to
wipe out wealth completely (that is, cr < 1+ar). Using the deﬁnitions of α and w























7Note that in order for the question of a possible NR regime to arise, at least some of public
wealth has to be held as nominal assets. In this example, we may assume that a part of the petroleum
wealth has been converted to ﬁnancial assets.
5w h i c hi st r u ea sl o n ga s1+ar − cr < 1+ar or equivalently cr > 0. Hence, as long
as the consumption rate cr is positive, the discounted real value of future wealth
will approach zero in the limit and the regime is R. In Akram (2005), the ‘eﬃcient’
consumption rate (the one that minimizes disturbances to the composition of the
economy’s sectors) depends positively on the real rate of return ar but negatively on
growth at home and abroad. Plausible parameter values seem to be consistent with
ap o s t i v ecr and hence with an R regime.
2.2 Potential evidence from a VAR estimation
Regardless how the present value budget constraint (4) gets satisﬁed, there should
be a positive correlation between the ratio of liabilities to GDP and the net present
value of surpluses relative to GDP. CCD explore empirical implications of alternative
hypotheses regarding how the equation gets satisﬁed, in order to shed light on the
causality question.
Firstly, they consider equation (3) repeated here
wj = sj + αjwj+1
i nt h ec a s ew h e r et h es u r p l u ss e r i e sr e s p o n d st or e a ll i a b i l i t i e st om a k es u r et h ep r e s e n t
value budget constraint (4) is satisﬁed. This is the case of an R regime, where wj may
be regarded as predetermined. The empirical implication is what one traditionally
would assume: Real liabilities wj+1 decline when there is a positive innovation in
the surplus. Hence the response in wj+1 to a shock in sj calculated from a VAR in
liabilities wj and surpluses sj should be negative. The mechanism is that the extra
s u r p l u sp a y so ﬀ liabilities, and future surpluses will be correspondingly lower. In
period t +1 , both sides of the present value budget constraint (4) have fallen.
Next CCD consider the case where the surplus series is exogenous and discount
factors or nominal GDP adjust to let the present value budget constraint be satisﬁed.
This is the deﬁnition of an NR regime. The empirical implication of this is that real
liabilities may respond in any way to a shock in the surplus. This means that the
impact multiplier calculated from a VAR in surpluses and liabilities may have any
sign, depending on the autocorrelation of the surplus. For example, with a positive
innovation in the surplus and no autocorrelation in the surplus, real liabilities in the
next period remain unaﬀected in an NR regime. This can be seen by forwarding
(4) one period. The right hand side has not changed, and hence the left hand side
remains unchanged. The mechanism is that the extra surplus pays oﬀ some liabilities
(the numerator of wt+1), but there is an oﬀsetting increase in the real value of the
liabilities (nominal GDP falls), resulting in no net eﬀect. With positive (negative)
autocorrelation in the surplus, the value-eﬀect via the denominator will be stronger
(weaker) than the liabilities-pay-oﬀ eﬀect, and real liabilities will increase (fall). This
means that one can distinguish between the two regimes in all cases except when
there is a negative autocorrelation in the surplus series.
62.3 Granger causality between liabilities and exogenous parts
of the surplus
Endogenously determined primary surpluses should be Granger caused by liabilities
in an R regime, because the surplus responds to the liabilities. Any component of
the surplus exogenous to the liabilities should not be Granger caused by liabilities in
an R regime, though. By contrast, in an NR regime, all parts of the primary surplus
should be Granger caused by real liabilities - even if they are exogenous to liabilities.
The reason is that today’s liabilities adjust to expected future surpluses. In order
to exploit this fact I will distinguish between the oil-tax component of the primary
surplus in Norway and the rest of the primary surplus.
The oil-tax component of the primary surplus may not be very responsive to public
liabilities even in an R regime. Revenues in the oil and gas sector are determined
largely by the world-market price of oil, which is exogenous to Norwegian production
decisions. Also, the volume of production may not be very responsive to short term
variations in public ﬁnancial needs. One would therefore expect to ﬁnd Granger
causality from liabilities to oil tax income only if the regime is NR. However, it is
possible that tax rates in the petroleum sector respond to public liabilities. The oil
price is strongly correlated with the oil-tax income series and therefore useful as an
instrument for oil tax income. Again the same logic applies: In an NR regime one
should ﬁnd Granger causality from real liabilities to the oil price, but not in an R
regime. Hence, I also test for Granger causality from real liabilities to the oil price.
3 Estimation
3.1 The data
The general government surplus (S), the oil tax (OILTAX) and net public liabilities
(W) for the period 1963 to 2003, all ﬁgures relative to nominal GDP, are graphed in
ﬁgure 1. In order to keep the same terminology as CCD, I keep working with negative
net public liabilities instead of net assets. For the sources of and the descriptions of
the ﬁscal data, see appendix A. Note that as long as income derived from natural
resources is included in the primary surplus, it is correct to work with ﬁgures for
public assets or liabilities excluding natural resources. Likewise, expected future
expenditures related to e.g. pension liabilities should be included in the relevant
expected primary surplus as long as those liabilities are not included in the W series.
Table 1 shows correlations between the series. As we would expect, surpluses S
and debt W are positively correlated. That is, when the liabilities are high at the
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Figure 1: Oil tax income (OILTAX), primary surplus (S) and public liabilities (W).
All series relative to nominal GDP.
with an R and an NR regime, causalities going in diﬀerent directions. Oil-tax income
and liabilities are not positively correlated on the other hand. This seems reasonable
in an R regime only, where there is no response in the beginning-of-year value of real
liabilities to the OILTAX. The series SNET, which is the surplus net of the oiltax,











The OILPRICE series is the annual average of the spot dollar price of brent blend8.
Since the exchange rate is endogenous and inﬂuenced by the oil price, I chose to use
the dollar price. Note the strong positive correlation between the OILTAX series and
8Source: Statistics Norway. The brent blend series is from 1978. Before this, the price of ‘Iran
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F i g u r e2 :T h eo i lt a xi n c o m ea n dt h eo i lp r i c ea r ep o s i t i v e l yc o r r e l a t e d .
the OILPRICE series. In ﬁgure 2, the OILTAX series and the OILPRICE series are
shown together. OILPRICENORM denotes the OILPRICE series relative to its own
sample mean while OILTAXNORM denotes the OILTAX series relative to its own
sample mean.
I am not able to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in any of the series debt
W, primary surplus S, OILTAX or OILPRICE9. Results referred in Hamilton (1994),
p. 549 imply that the VARs estimated in levels still may be interpreted as usual
when we focus on the lagged eﬀects on real debt from innovations in the other series.
However, the standard conﬁdence intervals for the Granger causality tests are not
reliable if nonstationary is present.
3.2 The VAR estimation results
First, I estimated a VAR in the primary surplus S and wealth W for the full time
period 1963-2003. I used a general-to-speciﬁc speciﬁcation procedure, starting with
ﬁve lags and checking for signiﬁcance of the lagged terms. The residuals of the
equations did not exhibit signiﬁcant autocorrelation with three lags and a constant
term, and I chose that speciﬁcation. The correlation of the residuals is 0.15, and hence
9I used a general-to-speciﬁc augmented Dickey Fuller test for each variable. I included a constant,
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Response of W to W
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Figure 3: A VAR in S and W, ordering S-W
the ordering of the variables should not be too important for the impulse response
functions.
Consider the impulse-response functions calculated with S ﬁrst. That ordering
would be natural in an NR regime, where real liabilities (at the beginning of the
period) can jump in response to an innovation in the surplus in the same period.
Figure 3 shows that the response in liabilities W after one period is negative (although
not signiﬁcantly so). This is what we would see in an R regime, but not in an NR
regime, given non-negative autocorrelation in the surplus series. But the upper left
panel of the ﬁgure shows that the surplus series responds negatively to an innovation
in itself after about six periods. Hence, the data may both have an R regime and NR
regime interpretation. Figure 4 below shows the impulse response functions with the
reverse ordering.
Ia l s oi n c l u d e dat i m et r e n d ,a n dIt r i e dw i t hm o r el a g sa n dIu s e ds h o r t e rt i m e
s e r i e st oa v o i dt h eb r e a k si nt h eﬁscal data series. In all cases, I found a similar
negative but insigniﬁcant response in liabilities to a shock in the surplus. I also found
an insigniﬁcant but negative response in S to a shock in itself. Table 2 shows that
there is a signiﬁcant and negative autocorrelation in the surplus series from lag 6.
Hence I conclude that the possible negative response in liabilities could be the result
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Response of W to W
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Figure 4: A VAR and S and W, ordering W-S
Table 2: Autocorrelation of S
Lag# Autocorrelation Partial autocorrelation Q statistic Probability
1 0.791 0.791 27.558 0.0
2 0.515 -0.293 39.560 0.0
3 0.330 0.102 44.608 0.0
40 . 2 2 3 −0.001 46.968 0.0
5 0.083 -0.212 47.309 0.0
6 -0.145 -0.313 48.361 0.0
7 -0.314 0.005 53.466 0.0
8 -0.407 -0.158 62.321 0.0
9 -0.359 0.221 69.430 0.0
10 -0.257 0.070 73.178 0.0
Next, I investigated the period 1973-2003. I am interested in whether utilizing the
OILTAX series can help me uncover the type of regime in place, and that series exists
from 1972 only. That is when oil production started in the Norwegian part of the
North Sea. There is a break in the series for ﬁscal data which I avoid when starting in
1973. I did the same estimation as above, but used the OILTAX series instead of the
S series. Again a three lag speciﬁcation seems appropriate. The residual correlation
is 0.20. W shows a zero response to a shock in OILTAX in the next period, as shown
in ﬁgure 5. This is with the ordering OILTAX-W (natural in an NR regime). With
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of W to W
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Figure 5: VAR in OILTAX and W, ordering OILTAX-W
in ﬁg u r e6b e l o w .W ek n o wt h a tw ew o u l dn o te x p e c tt h es a m eo n e - t o - o n ee ﬀect in W
t oas h o c ki nO I L T A Xa sw ew o u l dw i t hSw i t h i na nRr e g i m e .I np a r t i c u l a r ,w em a y
note that OILTAX is negatively correlated with SNET, the primary surplus net of
OILTAX. The eﬀect of OILTAX on W may therefore be cushioned by counteracting
eﬀects from the rest of the surplus. Hence, one interpretation of the result is that
the regime is R but that SNET cushions the eﬀect of OILTAX on S. A diﬀerent
interpretation is that on net there is no long run positive or negative autocorrelation
in the OILTAX series, and hence a zero response in W is natural if the regime is NR.
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Response of W to W
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Figure 6: VAR in OILTAX and W, ordering W-OILTAX
Table 3: Autocorrelation of OILTAX
Lag# Autocorrelation Partial autocorrelation Q statistic Probability
1 0.759 0.759 20.199 0.0
2 0.466 -0.257 28.088 0.0
3 0.218 -0.080 29.869 0.0
4 0.035 -0.058 29.917 0.0
5 -0.109 -0.111 30.392 0.0
6 -0.289 -0.279 33.879 0.0
7 -0.400 -0.042 40.850 0.0
8 -0.461 -0.145 50.498 0.0
9 -0.377 0.148 57.236 0.0
10 -0.302 -0.187 61.761 0.0
To conclude this section, both VAR exercises are inconclusive. Furthermore, given
the negative autocorrelation in the S series and the OILTAX series, a reﬁnement of
the VAR analysis cannot provide conclusive evidence.
3.3 Granger causality results
Recall that regardless what the regime is, one would expect Granger causality from
liabilities to surpluses: In an R regime, this would be because surpluses respond to
13previous debt levels. In an NR regime, this would be because expected future changes
in the surpluses would inﬂuence the real value of debt.
Table 4: Granger causality between S and W.
Null Hypothesis F-statistic Probability
S does not Granger cause W 8.84363 0.00006
W does not Granger cause S 3.01256 0.03234
In an R regime, any exogenous component of the surplus series would not be
Granger caused by debt, however. That would be diﬀerent in an NR regime, where all
components of the surplus would be Granger caused by debt. I exploit this diﬀerence
in order to ﬁgure out the likely regime in place in Norway. As shown in table 5, I
ﬁnd no evidence of Granger causality from W to OILPRICE (sample period 1973-
2003). I found it appropriate to estimate equations with four lags, but the result is
not sensitive to the number of lags.
Table 5: Granger causality from W to the OILPRICE.
Null Hypothesis F-statistic Probability
W does not Granger cause OILPRICE 0.28756 0.88240
With the oil tax (again sample 1973-2003), the result is as given in table 6. Now,
two lags seem appropriate.
Table 6: Granger causality from W to the OILTAX.
Null Hypothesis F-statistic Probability
W does not Granger cause OILTAX 0.05424 0.81754
To conclude, both the OILTAX data and OILPRICE data support the conclusion
that the regime is R rather than NR. The results should be interpreted with caution
however, given possibly nonstationary data.
4 Concluding remarks
The evidence from the VARs in surpluses and liabilities and in the oil tax and liabilities
is inconclusive. The reason is the negative autocorrelation in the surplus and oil-tax
data. However, given no evidence of Granger causality from real liabilities to the
oil tax or oil price I ﬁnd it natural to conclude that the regime is unlikely to be
Non-Ricardian, but rather is Ricardian.
An extension of the analysis might be to consider the response in the real value of
the liabilities from announcements of revisions of the estimated remaining volume of
oil reserves. In a Non-Ricardian regime, the real value of the liabilities should increase
- the value of assets should decrease - at each point in time when a discovery of new
oil ﬁelds or improved technology to extract oil was announced.
14Finally, I note that even if one can conclude clearly that real debt does not Granger
cause the oil price or tax income from the petroleum industry, and even if there were
no detectable response in real debt to discoveries of natural resources that provides
the public sector with income, some would still argue that one could not conclude
that the regime was R . The reason is that the net present value of surpluses net of
public sector oil income in theory could cushion the eﬀect of changed public oil sector
income even in an NR regime. For an interpretation of an NR regime that makes this
possible, see Cochrane (1998).
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Appendices
A Consolidated liabilities and the primary surplus
I have data for the consolidated government sector (central government and munici-
palities), but I need the consolidated net liabilities of the central bank and the general
government. The general government has e.g. large claims on the central bank, which
the central bank invests in foreign assets (the petroleum fund) and hence the consol-
idation is not trivial. It is convenient to consider the following simpliﬁed versions of
the central bank and general government’s balance sheets:
Table 1: The Balance Sheets of the Central Bank and the Government
Central Bank (CB) General Government (G)
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
BCB ACB ACB BCB
DC D A BP
R M B∗
F
BCB=C Bc l a i m so nG ,A CB= G claims on the CB,
DC = CB credit to the domestic private sector,
R= foreign reserves, D = private CB deposits,
M=notes and coins, F= the own funds of the CB,
A= G claims on the domestic private sector,
BP= G debt to the domestic private sector, B∗= foreign G debt
Netting out liabilities and assets between the central bank and the government
BCB and ACB, the consolidated total net public liabilities to the domestic and foreign
private sector is (BP +B∗ −A)+(D +M)−(DC +R). This is equal to net general
government liabilities (to both the private sector and the central bank) minus the
central bank’s own funds F. For simplicity, I measure consolidated net liabilities in
the latter way.I divide net liabilities with nominal GDP. Also, end-of-year ﬁgures are transferred
to beginning-of-year ﬁgures. That is, the series for total liabilities is forwarded one
period. I take the value of the net government liabilities from National Accounts data
provided by Statistics Norway , and the data for the Central Bank’s own funds from
the Central Bank’s annual reports10.
10The net debt series for general government (consolidated data for the central government and
municipalities) exists as annual data from 1962. I forward the data, and hence have consolidated
data from 1963. There are breaks in the ﬁscal data series in 1972 and 1978 (1973 and 1979 with
forwarding), due to new deﬁnitions of sectors and types of income/expenditure, and due to revisions
of the series in 1978. GDP ﬁgures were also revised from 1978 on, and again from 1991 on. I
calculated levels before 1978 using old growth rates for GDP.
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Figure 1 on page 7 illustrates the liabilities series W, together with the oil-tax
series (OILTAX) and the surplus series S, all ﬁgures relative to nominal GDP. Total
government net revenues from oil and gas related activities would in addition to
the tax income from the sector’s enterprises (as given in the OILTAX series), also
include net transfers from publicly owned enterprises doing oil and gas extraction,
and dividends from the government’s shareownership in the sector. In order to be
able to rely on National Accounts data I focus only on the oil and gas tax revenue
part.
The surplus concept s that corresponds to the primary surplus plus transfers from
the central bank is general government net income plus net expenditure related to
assets and liabilities, plus transfers from the central bank. Again, this is divided by
the nominal gross domestic product11.
11In the Norwegian National Accounts, this is measured as the budget surplus, which already
includes transfers from the central bank (‘oﬀentlig forvaltnings nettoﬁnansinvesteringer’), minus net
ﬁnancial income, minus net transfers from public enterprises. Since investments in public enterprises
appear on the balance sheet, the primary surplus should be net of income related to those assets.
Working with the standard primary surplus, only adjusting for net interest income, would not change
the results signiﬁcantly.18
B Working with liabilities in foreign currency
With assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currency it does not seem correct
to assume a common discount rate for all assets and liabilities in the net present
value budget constraint (4). However, assuming uncovered interest-rate parity and
working with the local currency value of foreign assets and liabilities is enough to
justify using a common discount rate. To see this, let net foreign liabilities in terms
of local currency be B∗
t.W eh a v eB∗
t = ft e Bt,w h e r ee Bt is net foreign liabilities in terms
of foreign currency and ft is the nominal exchange rate (units of local currency per





to paying down today’s liabilities (where i∗
t is the foreign nominal interest rate).
We can also think of B∗
t as negative: reducing foreign reserves can be used to pay
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(1+it). Hence, I conclude that discounting all assets and
liabilities by the same interest rate it is justiﬁed.
As an aside I note some consequences of assuming that the real exchange rate is
constant (purchasing power parity) in addition to uncovered interest-rate parity. If































instead of equation (2). As Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001a) note, foreign liabil-
ities work like indexed liabilities under these assumptions. The price level must jump
more for a given innovation in the surplus when part of the liabilities is foreign than
when all liabilities are domestic. The ﬁscal theory of price level determination is still
relevant as long as not all net liabilities are denominated in foreign currency.WORKING PAPERS (ANO) FROM NORGES BANK 2002-2005  
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